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Dispute Resolution & New Governance: Role of the 
Corporate Apology 
Michael B. Runnels† 
In the wake of the Great Recession,1 the public increasingly expects 
to see corporations express proper contrition for their errors.2  Likewise, 
corporate leaders,3 policy makers,4 and scholars5 have long recognized 
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 1. The “Great Recession” is a term of art increasingly used among legal scholars, which refers 
to the period beginning with the financial collapse of 2008 to the present. 
 2. Frank Rich, No One Is to Blame for Anything, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 10, 2010, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/11/opinion/11rich.html?sudsredirect=true.  Arguing that there is a 
singular lack among those credited with the financial collapse of 2008 to take responsibility, Rich 
quotes Alan Greenspan: 
I was right 70 percent of the time, but I was wrong 30 percent of the time,” said Alan 
Greenspan as he testified last week on Capitol Hill.  Greenspan—a k a the Oracle during 
his 18-year-plus tenure as Fed chairman—could not have more vividly illustrated how 
and why geniuses of his stature were out to lunch while Wall Street imploded.  No doubt 
he applied his full brain power to that 70-30 calculation.  But the big picture eludes him. 
If the captain of the Titanic followed the Greenspan model, he could claim he was on 
course at least 70 percent of the time too. 
Id.  See also Andrew Martin & Micheline Maynard, For Bankers, Saying ‘Sorry’ Has Its Perils, 
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 12, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/13/business/13blame.html?hp.  De-
scribing the level of anger directed at those considered responsible for the financial collapse of 2008, 
Martin and Maynard quote Michael Useem, a professor of management at the Wharton School of 
Business, who argues that “[t]he level of anger in this public in general is extremely high against 
those who led Wall Street into the abyss, in part because they never stepped forward to apologize for 
the mess they made.”  Id. 
 3. A Stitch in Time: How Companies Manage Risks to Their Reputation, ECONOMIST, Jan. 17, 
2008, at 12, 13 fig.5.  In responding to the query: “[w]hat are the main business benefits to your 
organi[z]ation of having a defined corporate-responsibility policy?” business leaders provided a 
range of responses, such as “[h]aving a better brand reputation, . . . [m]aking decisions that are better 
for our business in the long term, . . . [b]eing more attractive to potential and existing em-
ployees, . . . [m]eeting ethical standards required by customers,” and “[h]aving better relations with 
regulators and lawmakers . . . .”  Id. 
 4. Stefano Zamagni, Religious Values and Corporate Decision Making: An Economist’s Pers-
pective, 11 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 573, 581 (2006) (arguing that consumers who use their 
purchasing power to express moral sentiments motivate policymakers to seek corporations that are 
more socially responsible). 
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that corporations can and should be more responsive to public expecta-
tions of ethical corporate behavior.6  But the traditional means through 
which multiple stakeholders attempt to harmonize corporate behavior 
with these expectations,7 the modern corporate social responsibility 
(CSR) movement, is unlikely to incentivize ethical corporate behavior.8  
                                                                                                                            
 5. See Thomas W. Dunfee & David Hess, Getting From Salbu to the “Tipping Point”: The 
Role of Corporate Action Within a Portfolio of Anti-Corruption Strategies, 21 NW. J. INT’L L. & 
BUS. 471 (2001) (considering improved corporate behavior in the context of corruption in interna-
tional business); Timothy L. Fort, The Times and Seasons of Corporate Responsibility, 44 AM. BUS. 
L.J. 287 (2007) (suggesting that corporate focus on profitability puts people, businesses, and the free 
market at risk); Don Mayer, Community, Business Ethics, and Global Capitalism, 38 AM. BUS. L.J. 
215 (2001) (contributing to dialogues about community, corporate ethics, and the generation of 
potent moral norms); Don Mayer, Corporate Citizenship and Trustworthy Capitalism: Cocreating a 
More Peaceful Planet, 44 AM. BUS. L.J. 237 (2007) (considering links between corporate behavior 
and peaceful, sustainable societies); Daniel T. Ostas, Deconstructing Corporate Social Responsibili-
ty: Insights from Legal and Economic Theory, 38 AM. BUS. L.J. 261 (2001) (making the concept of 
corporate social responsibility useful by drawing insights from legal and economic theory).  See 
generally Thomas W. Dunfee & Timothy L. Fort, Corporate Hypergoals, Sustainable Peace, and 
the Adapted Firm, 36 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 563 (2003) (using the language of “hypergoals” to 
highlight universal principles that govern a wide range of organizations).  Dunfee and Fort’s work 
considers how corporations can achieve sustainable peace.  Id. at 563. 
 6. GEORGE CHENEY, JULIET ROPER & STEVE MAY, THE DEBATE OVER CORPORATE SOCIAL 
RESPONSIBILITY 3–7 (Steve May, George Cheney & Juliet Roper eds., 2007). 
 7. See Amiram Gill, Corporate Governance as Social Responsibility: A Research Agenda, 26 
BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 452, 463–66 (2008); see also CHENEY, ROPER & MAY, supra note 6, at 4 
(discussing the underlying policy priorities of the modern corporate social responsibility (CSR) 
movement and explaining that conversations about unchecked corporate power are central to conver-
sations about how to “probe in an informed and systematic way the potentials for positive social 
change in, through, and around the modern corporation”); John M. Conley & Cynthia A. Williams, 
Engage, Embed, and Embellish: Theory Versus Practice in the Corporate Social Responsibility 
Movement, 31 J. CORP. L. 1, 37–38 (2005) (describing CSR as “a complex communication network 
among public and private actors,” which, “[a]t its best, promises a corporate decision-making 
process in which managers think and talk openly about social and environmental issues and then tell 
the world what they did and why”). 
 8. Part of this unlikelihood stems from the traditional debate between those arguing that corpo-
rations should engage in CSR because they ought to do good for goodness’ sake and those viewing 
such arguments, by their own nature, as being inherently lost in translation if not linked with the 
corporate bottom line.  See M. Todd Henderson & Anup Malani, Corporate Philanthropy and the 
Market for Altruism, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 571 (2009) (characterizing the philosophical underpin-
nings of the CSR movement as based on the view that corporations have a moral duty to do good for 
others, even at the expense of the bottom line); see also David P. Baron, A Positive Theory of Moral 
Management, Social Pressure, and Corporate Social Performance, 18 J. ECON. & MGMT. 
STRATEGY 7, 1–4 (2009) (arguing that one of the principles underlying the CSR movement is that 
corporations have an abstract “moral duty” to do good); Elizabeth F. Brown, No Good Deed Goes 
Unpunished: Is There a Need for a Safe Harbor for Aspirational Corporate Codes of Conduct?, 26 
YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 367, 399 (2008) (explaining the reason why certain corporations do not 
engage in CSR).  Brown argues that some corporations do not engage in CSR partly because follow-
ing CSR principles is more expensive than not and these added costs cannot always be passed along 
to the consumer.  Id.  Moreover, Brown argues that “[p]art of those added costs are the costs asso-
ciated with increased risk of litigation that corporations adopting codes that embody CSR principles 
face.”  Id.; see also Janet E. Kerr, The Creative Capitalism Spectrum: Evaluating Corporate Social 
Responsibility Through a Legal Lens, 81 TEMP. L. REV. 831, 835 (2008) (characterizing CSR as 
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The modern CSR movement advocates improved corporate behavior.  
The movement asks corporations to broaden relationships with multiple 
stakeholders9 and to conform to society’s rules—those embodied in both 
law and ethical custom.10  In recent years, CSR has focused on corporate 
governance as a means through which CSR precepts may be incorporated 
into business decision-making processes.11 
Decrying the modern CSR movement as being effectively co-opted 
by corporate marketing strategies,12 critics argue that the movement is 
now little more than an elaborate public-relations charade whereby cor-
porations perform certain prescribed rituals while continuing to conduct 
business as usual.13  Corporate America’s disregard of the public’s desire 
for ethical corporate behavior is evident in the area of corporate dispute 
resolution.14  Though the argument may seem counterintuitive on first 
                                                                                                                            
profit-centric).  Kerr explains that since the effects of CSR on the bottom line have become quantifi-
able, the law supports, if not requires, corporate managers to investigate and consider whether CSR 
can impact the bottom line.  Id. at 839.  Kerr further argues that a corporate manager who does not 
consider such linkages could be considered derelict in her duty.  Id. 
 9. See supra note 7 and accompanying text. 
 10. See CHENEY, ROPER & MAY, supra note 6. 
 11. See supra note 7 and accompanying text. 
 12. See S. PRAKASH SETHI, SETTING GLOBAL STANDARDS: GUIDELINES FOR CREATING CODES 
OF CONDUCT IN MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS (2003) (regarding the marketing benefits from 
CSR and the widespread practice of insufficient or inconsistent implementation); Ruth V. Aguilera 
et al., Putting the S Back in Corporate Social Responsibility: A Multilevel Theory of Social Change 
in Organizations, 32 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 836, 838 (2007) (“Some companies introduce CSR prac-
tices at a superficial level for window-dressing purposes. . . .”); Joe W. (Chip) Pitts, III, Corporate 
Social Responsibility: Current Status and Future Evolution, 6 RUTGERS J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 334, 377 
(2009) (finding credible the critiques that consider “CSR as, at best, toothless and marketing-
oriented, and at worst a malevolent strategy to co-opt or render powerless the critical forces hoping 
to tame corporations with the more meaningful constraints of law”); see also Betsy Atkins, Is Cor-
porate Social Responsibility Responsible?, FORBES, Nov. 28, 2006, 
http://www.forbes.com/corporatecitizenship/2006/11/16/leadership-philanthropy-charity-leadcitizen-
cx_ba_1128directorship.html (detailing the disingenuousness of CSR campaigns).  Atkins writes 
“[T]here are practical reasons why corporations should cloak themselves in the politically correct 
rhetoric of social responsibility . . . .  [B]ut marketing should not be confused with significant dep-
loyments of corporate assets.”  Id.; see also Gill, supra note 7, at 462 (arguing that CSR “has be-
come a business-sensitive, if not business-driven practice”).  Gill notes that many critics consider the 
original social change motives of CSR to have been effectively subordinated to corporate marketing 
strategies.  Id. 
 13. See supra note 12 and accompanying text. 
 14. For an overview of dispute resolution theory and practice, see generally ROBERT A. 
BARUCH BUSH & JOSEPH P. FOLGER,  THE PROMISE OF MEDIATION (1994); GARY KLEIN, SOURCES 
OF POWER: HOW PEOPLE MAKE DECISIONS (1999); Robert S. Adler & Elliot M. Silverstein, When 
David Meets Goliath: Dealing with Power Differentials in Negotiations, 5 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 1, 
6–28, 77–110 (2000); James J. Alfini, Trashing, Bashing, and Hashing It Out: Is This the End of 
‘Good Mediation’?, 19 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 47 (1991); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Many Ways of 
Mediation: The Transformation of Traditions, Ideologies, Paradigms and Practices, 11 
NEGOTIATION J. 217 (1995); Michael Moffitt, Casting Light on the Black Box of Mediation: Should 
Mediators Make Their Conduct More Transparent?, 13 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 1 (1997); Mi-
chael L. Moffitt, Schmediation and the Dimensions of Definition, 10 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 69 
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impression, the use of corporate apologies is both good business and 
good ethics. 
The contention that apologies can play a central role in dispute res-
olution is one apparent even to an eight-year-old.15  An advocate of apol-
ogies in corporate dispute resolution and the founder of the Sorry Works! 
Coalition, Doug Wojcieszak,16 describes a hospital’s unapologetic beha-
vior following the medical-malpractice-induced death of his brother as 
the catalyst for his work in advocating corporate apologies: 
                                                                                                                            
(2005); Leonard L. Riskin, Mediator Orientations, Strategies and Techniques, 12 ALTERNATIVES TO 
HIGH COST LITIG. 111 (1994); Leonard L. Riskin, Mediator Orientations, Strategies and Tech-
niques: A Grid for the Perplexed, 1 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 7 (1996); Susan S. Silbey & Sally E. 
Merry, Mediator Settlement Strategies, 8 LAW & POL’Y 7 (1986); and Ellen A. Waldman, Identify-
ing the Role of Social Norms in Mediation: A Multiple Model Approach, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 703 
(1997). 
 15. Leonard L. Riskin, Mediation and Lawyers, 43 OHIO ST. L.J. 29, 33, 45–46 (1982) (arguing 
for an increased use of mediation among lawyers and discussing its lack of use resulting in a capaci-
ty for deafness to “ordinary good sense,” and arguing that mediation can lead to novel solutions, 
such as an apology, which could actually be in a client’s best interest (citing John D. Ayer, Isn’t 
There Enough Reality to Go Around? An Essay on the Unspoken Promises of Our Law, 53 N.Y.U. 
L. REV. 475, 489–90 (1978))). Riskin offers an interesting anecdote from Professor Kenney Heg-
land: 
 In my first year Contracts class, I wished to review various doctrines we had recent-
ly studied. I put the following: 
 In a long term installment contract, Seller promises Buyer to deliver widgets at the 
rate of 1000 a month.  The first two deliveries are perfect.  However, in the third month 
Seller delivers only 999 widgets.  Buyer becomes so incensed with this that he rejects the 
delivery, cancels the remaining deliveries and refuses to pay for the widgets already deli-
vered.  After stating the problem, I asked, “If you were Seller, what would you say?”  
What I was looking for was a discussion of the various common law theories which 
would force the buyer to pay for the widgets delivered and those which would throw 
buyer into breach for cancelling the remaining deliveries.  In short, I wanted the class to 
come up with the legal doctrines which would allow Seller to crush Buyer. 
 After asking the question, I looked around the room for a volunteer. As is so often 
the case with the first year students, I found that they were all either writing in their note-
books or inspecting their shoes.  There was, however, one eager face, that of an eight year 
old son of one of my students.  It seems that he was suffering through Contracts due to 
his mother’s sin of failing to find a sitter.  Suddenly he raised his hand. Such behavior, 
even from an eight year old, must be rewarded. 
 “OK,” I said, “What would you say if you were the seller?” 
 “I’d say, ‘I’m sorry.’” 
Id.; see also Bruce W. Neckers, The Art of the Apology, 81 MICH. B.J. (6) 10, 11 (2002); Hiroshi 
Wagatsuma & Arthur Rosett, The Implications of Apology: Law and Culture in Japan and the Unit-
ed States, 20 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 461, 493 (1986). 
 16. The Sorry Works! Coalition is a grassroots organization comprised of physicians, insurers, 
patients, attorneys, hospital administrators, and researchers.  The Coalition pursues three central 
goals: (1) educate the public and stakeholders about the power of disclosure and apology; (2) serve 
as an organizing force and central clearinghouse for information on full-disclosure methods; and (3) 
lobby for the development of the Sorry Works! programs across the nation.  THE SORRY WORKS! 
COALITION, http://www.sorryworks.net (last visited Apr. 2, 2010).  The Sorry Works! Coalition 
website is a comprehensive source for all issues and developments involving the role of apology in 
dispute resolution.  Id. 
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After the funeral and all the relatives and friends went home, my 
parents went back to the hospital seeking answers . . . .  “What hap-
pened? Why did it happen? Can the processes be improved so it 
never happens again?”  These were all questions my par-
ents . . . had. But the door was unceremoniously slammed in their 
face.  Meetings were promised, but did not transpire.  Even the 
surgeon who was so honest the night [my brother] died told my par-
ents: “Look, our legal counsel has instructed me not to speak with 
you any further. You will have to leave.”17 
Wojcieszak goes on to describe the dispassionate “deny and defend” 
ethos promulgated by defense attorneys18 as precisely what triggered his 
successful lawsuit against the hospital.19  Indeed, medical malpractice 
survey research suggests that victims desire apologies, and that some 
victims would have forgone litigation if the hospital had offered an apol-
ogy.20  Similarly, anecdotal evidence reveals parties who would have 
forgone litigation if they received an apology,21 settlement negotiations 
unraveling over the issue of an apology—even after the parties agreed on 
damages,22 plaintiffs who would have preferred an apology as part of a 
                                                        
 17. DOUG WOJCIESZAK, JAMES W. SAXTON & MAGGIE M. FINKELSTEIN, SORRY WORKS!: 
DISCLOSURE, APOLOGY, AND RELATIONSHIPS PREVENT MEDICAL MALPRACTICE CLAIMS 5 (2007). 
 18. See, e.g., Doug Wojcieszak, John Banja & Carole Houk, The Sorry Works! Coalition: 
Making the Case for Full Disclosure, 32 JOINT COMM’N J. ON QUALITY & PATIENT SAFETY 344, 347 
(2006) (“The old axiom of ‘deny and defend’ is a tried-and-failed risk management strategy because 
it increases patients’ and families’ anger and tendency to file lawsuits.  It sends a message of ‘Come 
and get us.’”). 
 19. Who is Sorry Works!?: Doug Wojciesazak, SORRY WORKS!, http://www.sorryworks.net/de
fault/who-is-sorry-works/douglas-wojcieszak (last visited Oct. 13, 2010). 
 20. See Thomas H. Gallagher et al., Patients’ and Physicians’ Attitudes Regarding the Disclo-
sure of Medical Errors, 289 J. AM. MED. ASSOC. 1001, 1001, 1005–06 (2003) (finding that patients 
emphasized a desire to receive an apology following a medical error); Gerald B. Hickson et al., 
Factors That Prompted Families to File Medical Malpractice Claims Following Perinatal Injuries, 
267 J. AM. MED. ASS’N, 1359, 1361 (1992) (noting that twenty-four percent of families filed claims 
“when they realized that physicians had failed to be completely honest with them about what hap-
pened, allowed them to believe things that were not true, or intentionally misled them”); Charles 
Vincent et al., Why Do People Sue Doctors? A Study of Patients and Relatives Taking Legal Action, 
343 LANCET 1609, 1612 (1994) (finding that thirty-seven percent of respondents said that they 
would not have sued had there been a full explanation and an apology, and fourteen percent indi-
cated that they would not have sued had there been an admission of negligence); Amy B. Witman et 
al., How Do Patients Want Physicians to Handle Mistakes? A Survey of Internal Medicine Patients 
in an Academic Setting, 156 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 2565, 2566 (1996) (“[Ninety-eight percent 
of respondents] desired or expected the physician’s active acknowledgement of an error.  This 
ranged from a simple acknowledgement of the error to various forms of apology, [and that patients] 
were significantly more likely to either report or sue the physician when he or she failed to acknowl-
edge the mistake.”). 
 21. See supra note 15 and accompanying text. 
 22. See Carl D. Schneider, What It Means to Be Sorry: The Power of Apology in Mediation, 17 
MEDIATION Q. 265, 274 (2000) (describing negotiations stalling “over the plaintiff’s demand for an 
apology, even after the sides had agreed on the damages to be paid!”) (emphasis omitted). 
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settlement,23 and occasions where a failure to apologize provoked litiga-
tion by adding insult to injury.24  Given the good ethics of the corporate 
apology, and that the modern CSR movement is unlikely to advance 
good corporate ethics, a “New Governance”25 approach is the best 
framework through which to create incentives for corporate apologies. 
New Governance is policyspeak for a contemporary approach to 
reform that encourages dialogue about regulatory principles from the 
perspectives of industry, CSR advocates, and shareholders.26  There is no 
                                                        
 23. See Piper Fogg, Minnesota System Agrees to Pay $500,000 to Settle Pay-Bias Dispute, 
CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Jan. 31, 2003, http://www.utsystem.edu/news/clips/dailyclips/2003/0126-
0201/HigherEd-CHE-Minnesota-013103.pdf (describing a class-action plaintiff’s disappointed reac-
tion to the settlement: “I want an apology,” she said, “and I’m never going to get it.” (internal quota-
tion marks omitted)). 
 24. Mary Ann Mariano’s comments about her sexual harassment and wrongful termination suit 
against the city of Highland, Florida are particularly of note.  See Mel Melendez, Highland Will Pay 
Ex-Official $500,000, SUN-SENTINEL, Aug. 2, 2000, http://articles.sun-sentinel.com/2000-08-
02/news/0008020144_1_highland-beach-mariano-sexual-harassment.  After accepting a settlement, 
Mariano stated that “[h]onestly, it’s never been about the money . . . .  If they had taken my concerns 
seriously, I wouldn’t have had to go to court.  All I wanted was a public apology.”  Id.  Another 
example of the practical value of an apology is seen by the statement of a lead plaintiff, which ap-
pears in the book, A Civil Action, an account of a civil suit in Massachusetts by families who alleged 
that toxic waste unlawfully dumped by two factories caused leukemia in their children.  JONATHAN 
HARR, A CIVIL ACTION (1995).  The lead plaintiff in the case, Anne Anderson, exclaimed to the 
attorney in the case that she “wasn’t after money” and rather, wanted an executive from one of the 
factories “to come to her front door and apologize.”  Id. at 452.  See also Jonathan R. Cohen,  Advis-
ing Clients to Apologize, 72 S. CAL. L. REV. 1009, 1010–11 (1999); Aviva Orenstein, Apology Ex-
cepted: Incorporating a Feminist Analysis into Evidence Policy Where You Would Least Expect It, 
28 SW. U. L. REV. 221, 243 (1999). 
 25. While New Governance theory is complex and its terminology and taxonomies are often 
contested, a core element in virtually all formulations is the idea of the social and public good that 
may be achieved through private–public associations and networks animated by a series of new 
regulatory frameworks and forms.  See generally Colin Scott, Regulation in the Age of Governance: 
The Rise of the Post-Regulatory State, in THE POLITICS OF REGULATION: INSTITUTIONS AND 
REGULATORY REFORMS FOR THE AGE OF GOVERNANCE 145 (Jacint Jordana & David Levi-Faur 
eds., 2004) (exploring theoretical approaches to regulation and providing a foundation for New 
Governance scholarship). 
 26. See Orly Lobel, The Renew Deal: The Fall of Regulation and the Rise of Governance in 
Contemporary Legal Thought, 89 MINN. L. REV. 342 (2004).  Characterizing the inclusive and dy-
namic nature of New Governance approaches, Lobel explains: 
Rather than oppositional, [this approach] aims for an appreciative positive stance, pulling 
together disparate ingredients and synthesizing elements from opposing schools of 
thought.  Through new governance approaches, contemporary thinkers can bring together 
in their research unlikely pairs, such as privatization and democratic theory.  The theory 
itself is thus reflexive, in the sense that it calls for integration in legal practice and corres-
pondingly exemplifies hybridization in the academic field.  Indeed, the theoretical basis 
for [this] vision mirrors its practical application in its inclusive spirit. 
Id. at 449; see also Cristie L. Ford, New Governance, Compliance, and Principles-Based Securities 
Regulation, 45 AM. BUS. L.J. 1, 5 (2008); Helen Hershkoff & Benedict Kingsbury, Crisis, Communi-
ty, and Courts in Network Governance: A Response to Liebman and Sabel’s Approach to Reform of 
Public Education, 28 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 319, 321–24 (2003); David Hess, Social 
Reporting and New Governance Regulation: The Prospects of Achieving Corporate Accountability 
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single model of New Governance, rather a series of evolving models that 
have been developed and tried in various industries around the globe.27  
The underlying policy priority of New Governance is that corporate go-
vernance mechanisms, if they are to be responsive to public expectations 
of good corporate ethics, must have greater flexibilities built into them.  
Moreover, those flexibilities ought to be animated by goals for out-
comes—not processes.28  While there is minimal overlap between the 
dispute resolution and New Governance literatures,29 both fields rely on 
many of the same assumptions about how to encourage collaborative 
ends.  Namely, both envision a flexible, problem-solving dynamic.  In 
dispute resolution, this flexible dynamic could be achieved through the 
careful consideration of skills.30  In New Governance, the same could be 
achieved through the careful consideration of institutional design.31 
In one application of New Governance theory, Professor Edward 
M. Epstein considers what factors may induce corporations to become 
“Good Companies,” ideal companies32 that are responsive to public ex-
                                                                                                                            
through Transparency, 17 BUS. ETHICS Q. 453, 455 (2007); William H. Simon, Solving Problems vs. 
Claiming Rights: The Pragmatist Challenge to Legal Liberalism, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 127, 
173–75 (2004); Susan Sturm, Gender Equity Regimes and the Architecture of Learning, in LAW AND 
NEW GOVERNANCE IN THE EU AND THE US 323, 328 (Gráinne de Búrca & Joanne Scott eds., 2006).  
See generally Orly Lobel, Setting the Agenda for New Governance Research, 89 MINN. L. REV. 498 
(2004); THE TOOLS OF GOVERNMENT: A GUIDE TO THE NEW GOVERNANCE (Lester M. Salamon ed., 
2002); Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism, 98 
COLUM. L. REV. 267, 345–56 (1998); Bradley C. Karkkainen, “New Governance” in Legal Thought 
and in the World: Some Splitting as Antidote to Overzealous Lumping, 89 MINN. L. REV. 471 
(2004); James S. Liebman & Charles F. Sabel, A Public Laboratory Dewey Barely Imagined: The 
Emerging Model of School Governance and Legal Reform, 28 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 183 
(2003). 
 27. See supra note 26 and accompanying text. 
 28. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.  See generally Edwin M. Epstein, The Good 
Company: Rhetoric or Reality? Corporate Social Responsibility and Business Ethics Redux, 44 AM. 
BUS. L.J. 207 (2007). 
 29. See generally Amy J. Cohen, Negotiation, Meet New Governance: Interests, Skills, and 
Selves, 33 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 503 (2008) (characterizing the dearth of overlap between these two 
bodies of scholarship as counterintuitive given that both rely on similar underlying policy priorities). 
 30. See Scott R. Peppet & Michael L. Moffitt, Learning How to Negotiate, in THE 
NEGOTIATOR’S FIELDBOOK 615 (Andrea Kupfer Schneider & Christopher Honeyman eds., 2006).  
Discussing the modus operandi of those engaged in dispute resolution, Scott Peppet and Michael 
Moffitt argue that they should 
search for underlying interests and potentially value-creating trades rather than take arbi-
trary haggling positions; explore the other side’s perspective through listening and empa-
thy even if you discover you disagree with it; build a working relationship with the other 
side; manage your emotions to engage productively in the conversation rather than sup-
pressing or ignoring feelings, etc.  The message in most negotiation courses today is that 
learning to negotiate requires learning to collaborate and problem-solve with others, de-
spite severe differences. 
Id. at 616. 
 31. See supra note 26 and accompanying text. 
 32. See Epstein, supra note 28, at 212–13. 
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pectations of ethical corporate behavior.33  In particular, he describes six 
factors—law, affinity-group regulation, self-regulation, ethical precepts, 
the media, and an engaged civil society—as “modes of social control”34 
that encourage corporations to engage in socially responsible behavior.35  
Epstein’s work provides a practical framework that allows scholars to 
engage in a systematic reconsideration of ways to incentivize the best 
corporate behavior. 
Although Epstein effectively describes the modes of social control 
that function as catalysts for good corporate ethics, his contention that 
each mode must be used individually to incentivize good corporate ethics 
robs the framework of the flexibility it needs to scrutinize a narrower set 
of goals.  I propose an alternative framework that incorporates Epstein’s 
modes but maintains the flexibility needed to make the framework effec-
tive.  Part I of this Article summarizes Epstein’s New Governance 
framework and his insights about the Good Company.  Part II integrates 
Epstein’s New Governance framework with the use of the corporate 
apology.  Part III briefly analyzes Epstein’s findings, suggests modifica-
tions to Epstein’s New Governance framework that would lend it greater 
flexibility, and positions the modifications in the context of New Gover-
nance scholarship.  The Article concludes by affirming Epstein’s ap-
proach to the Good Company and offering final reflections about foster-
ing Good Companies in the context of dispute resolution between corpo-
rations and individuals. 
I.  A NEW GOVERNANCE FRAMEWORK 
In The Good Company: Rhetoric or Reality? Corporate Social Re-
sponsibility and Business Ethics Redux,36 Epstein cogently analyzes the 
externalities37 linked with the management of corporations.38  Noting the 
                                                        
 33. Id. (arguing that CSR is inherently insufficient in achieving the Good company).  Epstein 
provides his own framework and describes corporations, by virtue of their economic and political 
power, as the most efficient proxies through which his framework can encourage the actualization of 
the Good Company.  Id. 
 34. Id. at 210–12. 
 35. Id. at 220 (discussing the desire for more socially responsible corporations). 
 36. See Epstein, supra note 28. 
 37. CSR is often viewed by scholars as a means to reduce negative corporate externalities.  
Geoffrey Heal, a Columbia Business School professor, similarly holds this view, defining CSR as “a 
programme of actions taken to reduce externalized costs or to avoid distributional conflicts.”  Geoff-
rey Heal, Corporate Social Responsibility: An Economic and Financial Framework, 30 THE 
GENEVA PAPERS 387, 387 (2005). 
 38. See Epstein, supra note 28, at 207–08 (discussing the nature of the corporation). 
Early on, it became apparent that these companies, trusts, and enterprises, in addition to 
being highly effective structures for developing complex industrial economies, were very 
significant social, political, and cultural institutions—individually and collectively—
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evolution of the corporate form from organizations exclusively dedicated 
to the public good39 to the modern corporation, Epstein considers discus-
sions of CSR to be the natural outgrowth of this evolution.40  In this age 
of the modern corporation, Epstein examines what factors, or modes of 
social control, may galvanize the realization of the Good Company.41  
Epstein defines six modes of social control in descending order of impor-
tance: law, affinity-group regulation, self-regulation, ethical precepts, the 
media, and an engaged civil society. Individually and in combination, the 
modes are fundamental to the actualization of the Good Company.42  
These modes of social control effectively operate as a New Governance 
framework.  Each mode will be described, in turn, below. 
First, Epstein selects law as the most important mode.  But he ex-
presses skepticism about the law’s ability to incentivize good corporate 
ethics because law, he argues, often articulates the least common deno-
minator of socially acceptable behavior.43 
Second, Epstein defines affinity-group regulation as standards of 
behavior established by members of a specific profession, such as law or 
medicine.44  Those corporations, operating under seriously administered 
affinity-group regulations, can be encouraged to be responsive to public 
expectations of good corporate ethics.45 
Third, self-regulation, unlike affinity-group regulation, pertains to 
the voluntary adherence to standards set by nongovernmental organiza-
tions (NGOs) concerned with specific issues,46 such as encouraging cor-
porate apologies.47  These standards often establish baselines that allow 
corporations to act in the public interest without experiencing competi-
tive disadvantage.48 
                                                                                                                            
possessing considerable power and profoundly affecting all aspects of society from the 
local to the global. 
Id. 
 39. Id. at 216 (arguing that the notion of corporations having a responsibility to serve the pub-
lic interest is rooted in the fact that the earliest corporations were designed to meet certain public 
service objectives, such as building “turnpikes, railroads, and canals . . . and [stimulating] the growth 
of essential industries”).  Epstein further argues, “It is ironic that modern society is only now return-
ing to recognition of these societal objectives of corporate enterprise.”  Id. 
 40. Id. at 207 (“[I]t is the emergence of large scale business organizations in the last third of 
the nineteenth century within Europe and the United States that gave rise to concerns about corpo-
rate social responsibility . . . .”). 
 41. Id. at 210. 
 42. Id. at 212. 
 43. Id. at 210. 
 44. Id. at 210–11. 
 45. Id. at 211. 
 46. Id. 
 47. See supra note 16 and accompanying text. 
 48. See Epstein, supra note 28, at 211. 
490 Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 34:481 
Fourth, Epstein characterizes ethical precepts as beliefs derived 
from religion, humanistic philosophy, social customs, mores, and tradi-
tions.49  If one considers law as the least common denominator of the 
social contract,50 ethical precepts operate above this common denomina-
tor and often inform the creation of the law. 
Fifth, because it is often the first source of information about corpo-
rate wrongdoing, a vigilant and responsible media, Epstein argues, is 
central to promoting Good Companies.51  Critical media coverage can 
hold corporations accountable for illegal or unethical behavior.52  Alter-
natively, favorable media coverage can result in increased business activ-
ity through the cultivation of corporate goodwill and serve as a catalyst 
for the actualization of Good Companies.53 
Finally, Epstein argues that an engaged civil society is a mode of 
social control that can encourage socially responsible behavior from cor-
porations.54  While successful examples exist,55 direct citizen action is 
not always effective in fostering the Good Company.56 
As noted earlier,57 Epstein considers the CSR movement alone as 
inept at achieving the Good Company.  This view, Epstein explains, is 
based not on any belief in the inherent malevolence of the corporate 
form, but rather on recognition of the structures that define the contem-
porary business environment—structures that corporations and their 
managers must abide by.58  Epstein argues that an increasingly competi-
tive globalized economy, driven by the Anglo-American modus operandi 
of short-term profit maximization,59 encourages corporations to disregard 
the public’s desire for ethical corporate behavior.60  In this context, cor-
porations are neither inherently good nor bad, but are manifestly able to 
                                                        
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. at 211–12. 
 51. Id. at 212. 
 52. Id. (noting the role of the media in exposing corporate wrongdoing).  Epstein highlights the 
disclosures relating to the Enron scandal and suspect marketing strategies relating to major pharma-
ceutical companies.  Id. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. 
 55. See generally María Elena Durazo, Making Movement: Communities of Color and New 
Models of Organizing Labor, 27 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 235 (2006) (describing the successful 
efforts of hotel worker unionization and its positive effects on the working conditions of hotel em-
ployees). 
 56. See Epstein, supra note 28, at 212. 
 57. See supra note 33 and accompanying text. 
 58. See Epstein, supra note 28, at 212–13. 
 59. See Claire Moore Dickerson, Culture and Trans-Border Effects: Northern Individualism 
Meets Third-Generation Human Rights, 54 RUTGERS L. REV. 865, 878 (2002) (considering the ad-
verse effect of corporations’ singular focus on short-term profit maximization on good corporate 
ethics); see also Epstein, supra note 28, at 213. 
 60. Epstein, supra note 28, at 212–213. 
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amplify either on a large scale.61  Accordingly, given the origin of the 
corporation62 and its singular ability to affect the public good,63 Epstein 
posits his modes of social control as the New Governance framework by 
which the Good Company can be achieved.64 
II.  ADAPTING EPSTEIN’S NEW GOVERNANCE FRAMEWORK TO ADVANCE 
THE CORPORATE APOLOGY 
A.  Ethical Precepts and Apology 
Although useful, Epstein’s discussion of the six modes is insuffi-
ciently narrowly tailored to the use of the corporate apology.  To more 
appropriately apply the modes to corporate apologies, this Article alters 
their order of importance.  Because the power of an apology stems from 
its role as an ethical act,65 and given the interdependence of law and eth-
ics,66 the ethics mode will be discussed first, followed by a discussion of 
                                                        
 61. See Epstein, supra note 28, at 213–14; see also supra note 38 and accompanying text. 
 62. See supra note 39 and accompanying text. 
 63. See Pitts, supra note 12, at 380 (arguing that corporations occupy a unique role in their 
ability to affect significant social change).  Pitts explains that since “a relatively small number of 
[corporations] represent[] a large proportion of global economic activity,” successful efforts to pre-
vail upon corporate behavior can result in a significant social impact.  Id.; see also David Kinley & 
Junko Tadaki, From Talk to Walk: The Emergence of Human Rights Responsibilities for Corpora-
tions at International Law, 44 VA. J. INT’L L. 931, 933 (2004) (advocating the adoption of New 
Governance approaches and arguing that the economic and political muscle of corporations uniquely 
position them to significantly impact the enjoyment of human rights).  Kinley and Tadaki explain 
that the concerted efforts of myriad entities, from workers, states, and NGOs to the corporations 
themselves, are needed to highlight the behavior of corporations and to hold them accountable for 
such behavior.  Id. at 934.  The authors further argue that since corporations habitually compartmen-
talize their economic interests and good ethics as distinct and unrelated aspects of their interest, 
corporations habitually treat concern for good ethics as a peripheral matter.  Id. at 1022.  As such, 
the authors call on “every individual and every organ of society” to defend the value of ethics by 
prevailing upon corporations to conceptualize their economic bottom line and basic ethics as funda-
mentally inseparable.  Id. 
 64. Epstein, supra note 28, at 220 (discussing the desire for more socially responsible corpora-
tions, Epstein writes that he envisions “better companies, or organizations that continuously seek to 
perform the economic functions for which society relies upon them in a manner that optimizes the 
firm’s utility to the diverse stakeholders affected by their actions and minimizes the deleterious 
effects . . . of their operations.”). 
 65. See Lee Taft, Apology Subverted: The Commodification of Apology, 109 YALE L.J. 1135, 
1138 (2000) (discussing the role that an apology could have played in the settlement of a medical 
malpractice case in which the author, Dean of Student Life at Harvard Divinity School, represented a 
deceased’s wife and observing that an “apology is a complicated and courageous act, one rich in 
moral meaning.”).  Taft further observes that such an expression “can facilitate forgiveness and the 
kind of healing my client desired.”  Id. 
 66. See Milton Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business Is To Increase Its Profits, 
N.Y. TIMES MAG., Sept. 13, 1970, https://wiki.brown.edu/confluence/download/attachments/683543
79/Friedman+article.pdf (describing the social responsibility of the corporate executive).  Friedman 
argues that this responsibility “is to conduct business in accordance with [the shareholder’s] desires, 
which generally will be to make as much money as possible while conforming to the basic rules of 
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law.  A discussion of the other modes of social control in a reconfigured 
order of importance, concluding with self-regulation, will then follow. 
In view of apology’s role as an ethical precept in action, an effec-
tive apology must first be properly defined.  Authors differ as to what 
constitutes an effective apology.  For example, Aviva Orenstein, one of 
the first legal scholars to consider the role of apology in corporate dis-
pute resolution,67 explained the attributes of an effective apology: 
At their fullest, apologies should: (1) acknowledge the legitimacy of 
the grievance and express respect for the violated rule or moral 
norm; (2) indicate with specificity the nature of the violation; (3) 
demonstrate understanding of the harm done; (4) admit fault and re-
sponsibility for the violation; (5) express genuine regret and re-
morse for the injury; (6) express concern for future good relations; 
(7) give appropriate assurance that the act will not happen again; 
and, if possible, (8) compensate the injured party.68 
In their pioneering 1986 article discussing the role of apology in dispute 
resolution,69 Hiroshi Wagatsuma and Arthur Rossett argue that a “mea-
ningful apology” must communicate five essential components: (1) the 
harmful act happened, caused injury, and was wrongful; (2) the apolo-
gizer was at fault and regrets participating in the act; (3) the apologizer 
will compensate the injured party; (4) the act will not happen again; and 
(5) the apologizer intends to work for future good relations.70  Jonathan 
R. Cohen, another legal scholar in the field of dispute resolution, identi-
fies three elements of an effective apology: “(i) admitting one’s fault, (ii) 
expressing regret for the injurious action, and (iii) expressing sympathy 
for the other’s injury.”71  For the purposes of this Article, an apology is 
defined as an expression of regret that acknowledges fault, is accompa-
                                                                                                                            
the society, both those embodied in law and those embodied in ethical custom.”  Id.  While Friedman 
formulates this argument as a response to the CSR movement, he fails to consider how ethical cus-
tom and the law interact.  Indeed, he fails to consider that ethical custom and the laws are, in fact, 
interdependent.  See, e.g., Cyrus Mehri, Andrea Giampetro-Meyer & Michael B. Runnels, One Na-
tion, Indivisible: The Use of Diversity Report Cards to Promote Transparency, Accountability, and 
Workplace Fairness, 9 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 395, 407 (2004); see also Epstein, supra note 
28, at 212 (arguing that “[l]aw and ethics are not, of course, mutually exclusive and legal require-
ments frequently derive from and incorporate ethical precepts . . . what were ethical aspirations for 
business behavior in one generation frequently become legal requirements in the next”). 
 67. See generally Orenstein, supra note 24. 
 68. Id. at 239. 
 69. See Wagatsuma & Rosett, supra note 15, at 461, 493. 
 70. Id. at 469–70. 
 71. Cohen, supra note 24, at 1014–15. 
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nied by steps ensuring that the harmful act will not occur again, and is 
coupled with compensation for the harmed party.72 
As noted earlier,73 an apology functions, in fact, as an ethical pre-
cept given voice through action.  Therefore, when offenders apologize 
for tortious behavior, “the offense and the intention that produced it are 
less likely to be perceived as corresponding to some underlying trait of 
the offender.”74  Consequently, apologies influence beliefs about the 
general character of the offender, and when an apology is offered, the 
offender is viewed as having better character.75  The apologetic offender 
will therefore be perceived as less likely to engage in similar offending 
behavior in the future.76  Apologies also tend to reduce negative emo-
tions, such as anger,77 and increase levels of more positive emotions, 
                                                        
 72. Wagatsuma & Rosett, supra note 15, at 487 (arguing that “[a]n apology without reparation 
is a hollow form,” and discussing the centrality of compensation to an apology). 
 73. Epstein, supra note 28, at 213. 
 74. Seiji Takaku, The Effects of Apology and Perspective Taking on Interpersonal Forgive-
ness: A Dissonance-Attribution Model of Interpersonal Forgiveness, 141 J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 494, 495 
(2001); see Edward E. Jones & Keith E. Davis, From Acts to Dispositions: The Attribution Process 
in Person Perception, in 2 ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 219, 222–36 (Leo-
nard Berkowitz ed., 1965) (describing correspondent inference theory). 
 75. See, e.g., Bruce W. Darby & Barry R. Schlenker, Children’s Reactions to Apologies, 43 J. 
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 742, 746–52 (1982); Bruce W. Darby & Barry R. Schlenker, Child-
ren’s Reactions to Transgressions: Effects of the Actor’s Apology, Reputation and Remorse, 28 
BRIT. J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 353, 360 (1989); Gregg J. Gold & Bernard Weiner, Remorse, Confession, 
Group Identity, and Expectancies About Repeating a Transgression, 22 BASIC & APPLIED SOC. 
PSYCHOL. 291, 291–92 (2000); Marti Hope Gonzales et al., Victims as “Narrative Critics”: Factors 
Influencing Rejoinders and Evaluative Responses to Offenders’ Accounts, 20 PERSONALITY & SOC. 
PSYCHOL. BULL. 691, 698 (1994); Ken-ichi Ohbuchi et al., Apology as Aggression Control: Its Role 
in Mediating Appraisal of and Response to Harm, 56 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 219, 219–
24 (1989); Ken-ichi Ohbuchi & Kobun Sato, Children’s Reactions to Mitigating Accounts: Apolo-
gies, Excuses, and Intentionality of Harm, 134 J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 5, 11 (1994); Jennifer F. Orleans & 
Michael B. Gurtman, Effects of Physical Attractiveness and Remorse on Evaluations of Transgres-
sors, 6 ACAD. PSYCHOL. BULL. 49, 49 (1984); Bernard Weiner et al., Public Confession and For-
giveness, 59 J. PERSONALITY 281, 285–86 (1991). 
 76. See, e.g., Gold & Weiner, supra note 75, at 291–92; Ohbuchi et al., supra note 75, at 219–
20; Orleans & Gurtman, supra note 75, at 52–53; Gary S. Schwartz et al., The Effects of Post-
Transgression Remorse on Perceived Aggression, Attributions of Intent, and Level of Punishment, 
17 BRIT. J. SOC. CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 293, 297 (1978); Weiner et al., supra note 76, at 285. 
 77. See, e.g., THANE ROSENBAUM, THE MYTH OF MORAL JUSTICE: WHY OUR LEGAL SYSTEM 
FAILS TO DO WHAT’S RIGHT 181–82 (2004) (discussing the role of anger as a catalyst for lawsuits). 
The failure . . . to accept moral responsibility and apologize for [the offender’s] wrongs 
contributes to a burning, implacable resentment that finds its way into legal complaints.  
When the guilty and the responsible, the complicit and the neglectful, do not acknowl-
edge that damage was done, do not express their regret and sympathy, and do not take ac-
count of their actions, insult is added to injury. And the resulting alchemy is lethal and 
toxic.  Without an apology, why would anyone not resort to legal measures?  The burden 
shifts to them to find their own means to reconcile—to stew, by themselves, without a 
word of compassion or repentance from the very people whom they need to hear from the 
most. 
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such as favorably viewing the offender.78  Indeed, an illustrative example 
of a corporation delivering an effective apology in this vein is provided 
in the fallout of the 1996 Odwalla Corporation E. coli scare. 
When Odwalla CEO Stephen Williamson received notice from the 
FDA that his company’s apple juice was possibly linked to a deadly 
strain of E. coli, his first step was not to consult his attorney or summon 
the board of directors.79  Rather, he accepted responsibility for the out-
break and ordered an immediate $6.5 million recall of all suspected 
products.80  Once the E. coli link was confirmed and illnesses were re-
ported across the United States,81 Odwalla sales dropped 90% and stock 
prices fell 34%.82  Immediately after, Odwalla held a press briefing to 
discuss the linkage and share the expertise of their newly-created advi-
sory council comprised of industry experts on food safety, microbiology, 
and regulatory issues implicated in the outbreak.  Moreover, the compa-
ny provided a forum for discussion of the implications of the outbreak on 
the fresh-fruit industry83 and offered to pay the medical bills of those 
made sick by Odwalla’s products.84  The company also issued a state-
ment expressing its sorrow over the death of a sixteen-month-old Colo-
rado girl who experienced multiple organ failure due to an E. coli infec-
tion from apple juice, although it was unclear at the time whether an 
Odwalla product caused her illness.85  Furthermore, company founder 
and Chairman Greg Steltenpohl visited the girl’s family in addition to the 
other outbreak victims’ families.86 Odwalla is now the nation’s leading 
                                                                                                                            
Id.; see, e.g., Mark Bennett & Deborah Earwaker, Victims’ Responses to Apologies: The Effects of 
Offender Responsibility and Offense Severity, 134 J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 457, 462 (1994); Gold & Wein-
er, supra note 76, at 291–93; Ohbuchi et al., supra note 76, at 219–20; Takaku, supra note 74, at 
495; Weiner et al., supra note 76, at 286. 
 78. See supra note 74 and accompanying text. 
 79. See Anni Layne, How to Make your Company More Resilient: The Lessons Learned Dur-
ing Odwalla’s 1996 E. coli Crisis Have Guided the Juice Company to Financial Recovery and Ex-
plosive Growth, FAST COMPANY, Feb. 28, 2001, 
http://www.fastcompany.com/articles/2001/03/odwalla.html (examining the fallout of the Odwalla 
E. coli crisis). 
 80. Id.; see Nancy Brumback, Officials Question Safety of Unpasteurized Juices, 
SUPERMARKET NEWS, Nov. 11, 1996, at 35. 
 81. E. Coli O157:H7 Strain in Odwalla Matches Current Outbreak, BUS. WIRE, Nov. 5, 1996, 
http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0EIN/is_1996_Nov_5/ai_18833914. 
 82. See Layne, supra note 79. 
 83. See Odwalla Expresses Ongoing Concern for Sick, Gratitude for Public Support, 
NEWSWIRE, Nov. 3, 1996, http://www.thefreelibrary.com/Odwalla+Expresses+Ongoing+Concern+f
or+Sick,+Gratitude+for+Public...-a018821116; Odwalla to Hold Press Briefing, NEWSWIRE, Nov. 
18, 1996, http://www.thefreelibrary.com/Odwalla+To+Hold+Press+Briefing-a018860993. 
 84. See Brumback, supra note 80, at 37. 
 85. Nancy Brumback, E.coli Outbreak in West Claims Toddler as Victim, SUPERMARKET 
NEWS, Nov. 18, 1996, at 31. 
 86. See Brumback, supra note 80, at 31. 
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fresh-juice distributor.87  Reflecting on the survival and success of Od-
walla, Williamson observed that 
Odwalla didn’t survive by accident.  For fifteen years, we built a re-
servoir of goodwill in the Bay Area.  When crisis struck, some of 
that goodwill drained away, but a lot of people still believed in Od-
walla, partially because we never deceived or manipulated them.  
When things go bad, people want to look inside a company and to 
see whether its soul is good. Ours is.88 
While the above example properly frames the structure of what 
constitutes an effective corporate apology89—and how such a respon-
siveness to the public’s expectation of good corporate ethics may be 
good business,90some corporations may find little in this argument to be 
availing.  Indeed, due to the risk that an apology may leave corporations 
                                                        
 87. See Layne, supra note 79. 
 88. Id. 
 89. See Lee Taft, On Bended Knee (With Fingers Crossed), 55 DEPAUL L. REV. 601, 615 
(2006).  Consistent with this Article’s definition of an effective apology and treatment of an apology, 
per se, as an ethical precept in action, Taft refers to apology as “repentance” and argues that 
authentic repentance alleviates suffering because it adds this critical dimension of mean-
ing to one who suffers. In its authentic expression, it acknowledges that a wrong has oc-
curred and that it was not the claimant’s fault.  Repentance also offers compensa-
tion . . . .  And, importantly, the final element of authentic repentance, restructuring, 
communicates that the party who committed the wrong has learned from the mistake and 
has effected a change in behavior or practice so that others will not be similarly harmed.  
Restructuring was the nonmonetary element that was of critical importance to [his] 
clients because, to the extent it served as a catalyst for change, it injected meaning into 
what might otherwise have been senseless tragedy.  Knowing that others will not be simi-
larly harmed matters. 
Id. 
 90. This rationale was followed in the landmark case for corporate apologies, namely, the 1982 
Tylenol scare, where a still-unidentified individual injected cyanide into Tylenol capsule bottles.  
After seven people died from ingesting the poison-laced capsules, Johnson & Johnson CEO, James 
Burke, delivered a sweeping apology to the public within hours of the first news of deaths and before 
the corporation was fully aware of where the cyanide originated.  The first element of Burke’s apol-
ogy was to announce an immediate recall of all Tylenol capsules on the shelves nationwide.  Burke 
then encouraged customers to return their Tylenol bottles in exchange for a voucher so that their 
customers would not risk injury.  See Sarah Kellogg, The Art and Power of the Apology, WASH. 
LAW., June 2007, 
http://www.dcbar.org/for_lawyers/resources/publications/washington_lawyer/june_2007/apology.cf
m.  The second part of the company’s response was the decision by Johnson & Johnson to re-
engineer Tylenol’s product packaging to make their bottles tamper-proof.  This comprehensive apol-
ogy, which demonstrated that the company would do the right thing, created immediate, widespread, 
and lasting goodwill for Johnson & Johnson.  Indeed, after settling with several families, Tylenol 
regained 70% of its market share within six months of the crisis, and it remains a trusted brand to-
day.  See, e.g., Taryn Fuchs-Burnett, Mass Public Corporate Apology, 57 DISP. RESOL. J. 27, 82–83 
(2002) (detailing the actions taken by Johnson & Johnson to address the Tylenol public relations 
crises). 
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open to liability,91 corporations may view these arguments as little more 
than a naive expectation for them to do good for goodness’ sake.  The 
corporate fear of the legal risks entailed in an apology, however, is justi-
fied. 
B.  Law and Apology 
Epstein rightly expresses skepticism as to the law’s ability to incen-
tivize good corporate ethics.  Indeed, regarding how courts may treat the 
corporate apology,92 the Federal Rules of Evidence effectively function 
                                                        
 91. See ROSENBAUM, supra note 77, at 199 (referring to the offer of an apology as “moral 
behavior”).  Rosenbaum laments the chilling effect that Federal Rule of Evidence 408 has on this 
behavior: 
You do the right thing, and in the eyes of the law, you get punished.  In the immediate af-
termath of an accident, human beings shouldn’t be thinking about how an act of human 
decency will later be perceived in a court of law.  When a person is acting spontaneously, 
apologizes for his actions and shows concern, liability isn’t, nor should it be, on his or her 
mind. The human element is furthered when attention is paid to humanity, not immunity.  
Yet the legal system robs this gesture of its moral force, and punishes those who bravely 
accept the legal pitfalls that arise from [offering an apology].  And insurance compa-
nies—the deep pockets in all of these actions, but not the entity that caused the actual 
harm—are focused entirely on presenting the best legal defense, which apparently is 
compromised if the insured says too much, or the wrong thing. 
Id. 
 92. For an overview of the dispute resolution literature considering the proper relationship 
between apology and the law, see, e.g., William K. Bartels, The Stormy Seas of Apologies: Califor-
nia Evidence Code Section 1160 Provides a Safe Harbor for Apologies Made After Accidents, 28 W. 
ST. U. L. REV. 141, 156 (2001); Max Bolstad, Learning from Japan: The Case for Increased Use of 
Apology in Mediation, 48 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 545, 545 (2000); Jennifer K. Robbennolt, Attorneys, 
Apologies, and Settlement Negotiation, 13 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 349, 350–51 (2008); Cohen, su-
pra note 24, at 1013; Fuchs-Burnett, supra note 90, at  27; Elizabeth Latif, Apologetic Justice: Eva-
luating Apologies Tailored Toward Legal Solutions, 81 B.U. L. REV. 289, 320 (2001); Erin Ann 
O’Hara & Douglas Yarn, On Apology and Consilience, 77 WASH. L. REV. 1121, 1122–23 (2002); 
Orenstein, supra note 24, at 221–23; Donna L. Pavlick, Apology and Mediation: The Horse and 
Carriage of the Twenty-First Century, 18 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 829, 831 (2003); Jennifer K. 
Robbennolt, Apologies and Legal Settlement: An Empirical Examination, 102 MICH. L. REV. 460, 
461–63 (2003) [hereinafter Robbennolt, Apologies and Legal Settlement]; Jennifer K. Robbennolt, 
What We Know and Don’t Know About the Role of Apologies in Resolving Health Care Disputes, 21 
GA. ST. U. L. REV. 1009, 1009–10 (2005) [hereinafter Robbennolt, Role of Apologies]; Michael B. 
Runnels, Apologies All Around: Advocating Federal Protection for the Full Apology in Civil Cases, 
46 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 137, 139–40 (2009); Taft, supra note 65, at 1135–36; Wagatsuma & Rosett, 
supra note 15, at 478–79; Brent T. White, Say You’re Sorry: Court-Ordered Apologies as a Civil 
Rights Remedy, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 1261, 1261–63 (2006); Lucinda E. Jesson & Peter B. Knapp, 
My Lawyer Told Me to Say I’m Sorry: Lawyers, Doctors, and Medical Apologies, 35 WM. 
MITCHELL L. REV. 1410, 1411–12 (2009); Deborah L. Levi, Note, The Role of Apology in Media-
tion, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1165, 1166 (1997); Jonathan R. Cohen, Ethical Quandary: Advising the 
Client Who Wants to Apologize, DISP. RESOL. MAG., Spring 1999, at 19; Schneider, supra note 22, at 
265; William Bradford, “With a Very Great Blame on Our Hearts”: Reparations, Reconciliation, 
and an American Indian Plea for Peace with Justice, 27 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 1, 44 (2002); and 
Charles R. Calleros, Conflict, Apology, and Reconciliation at Arizona State University: A Second 
Case Study in Hateful Speech, 27 CUMB. L. REV. 91, 125 (1997). 
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as a disincentive to apologize.93  Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2) 
provides that an admission of fault by a party-opponent is “not hearsay” 
and, therefore, not excluded from admissibility by the hearsay rule.94  
Rule 801(d)(2) defines an admission by a party-opponent as “the party’s 
own statement, in either an individual or a representative capacity . . . .”95  
Consequently, even though an apology would fit the classical definition 
of hearsay as an out-of-court statement “offered in evidence to prove the 
truth of the matter asserted,”96 the Federal Rules of Evidence treat it as 
non-hearsay and thus as admissible evidence. 
In civil cases, which are the exclusive focus of this Article,97 Feder-
al Rule of Evidence 408 applies to “compromise and offers to compro-
mise” and provides that “[e]vidence of . . . conduct or statements made in 
compromise negotiations” are inadmissible to prove liability for or inva-
                                                        
 93. See ROSENBAUM, supra note 77, at 186 (contextualizing the consequences of apologizing 
in the American judicial system).  Rosenbaum laments that “[a]pologies are yet another example of 
the law’s forced separation between the legal and the moral.  Morally we know we should apologize; 
legally we know that we are not obligated to, and that there may even be legal consequences to 
doing so.”  Id. 
 94. FED. R. EVID. 801(d). 
 95. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(A).  Rule 801(d)(2) provides that a statement is not hearsay if 
[t]he statement is offered against a party and is (A) the party’s own statement, in either an 
individual or a representative capacity or (B) a statement of which the party has mani-
fested an adoption or belief in its truth, or (C) a statement by a person authorized by the 
party to make a statement concerning the subject, or (D) a statement by the party’s agent 
or servant concerning a matter within the scope of the agency or employment, made dur-
ing the existence of the relationship . . . . 
FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2). 
 96. FED. R. EVID. 801(c). 
 97. There are several rationales for this.  Rule 408 addresses only civil cases.  As Cohen ex-
plained: 
This is in contrast to most American evidence law which draws no distinction between 
civil and criminal cases.  Further, criminal charges are brought by the state rather than the 
injured person.  If the offender apologizes to the injured party in a civil case, this means 
that the defendant has apologized to the plaintiff.  In a criminal case, that correspondence 
is severed.  Criminal cases also present a risk of coerced confessions.  As reflected in the 
Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination, constitutional law has long been wary 
of the potential for the state to abuse its power and coerce confessions, both false and 
true. 
Jonathan R. Cohen, Legislating Apology: The Pros and Cons, 70 U. CIN. L. REV. 819, 823 (2002) 
(footnotes omitted).  As Justice Frankfurter expressed, involuntary confessions are excluded 
not because such confessions are unlikely to be true but because the methods used to ex-
tract them offend an underlying principle in the enforcement of our criminal law: that 
ours is an accusatorial and not an inquisitorial system—a system in which the State must 
establish guilt by evidence independently and freely secured and may not by coercion 
prove its charge against an accused out of his own mouth. 
Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534, 540–41 (1961) (citations omitted).  In civil cases, there is typi-
cally little risk that a plaintiff will coerce a confession from the defendant, but in a criminal setting, 
that risk is quite real.  Cohen, supra, at 823. 
498 Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 34:481 
lidity of a claim or its amount.98  The rationale for this rule is the “pro-
motion of the public policy favoring the compromise and settlement of 
disputes.”99  Therefore, an apology made during settlement negotiations 
generally should not be admissible to prove liability.  There are, howev-
er, three significant limitations to the rule.  First, an apology may be ad-
missible to impeach a witness.100  Second, the rule does not proscribe 
such evidence from being revealed to third parties.101  And third, apolo-
gies are only inadmissible if offered during “compromise negotia-
tions.”102  All these limitations undermine the underlying policy priority 
                                                        
 98. FED. R. EVID. 408. The rule provides in relevant part: 
(a) Prohibited uses. Evidence of the following is not admissible on behalf of any party, 
when offered to prove liability for, invalidity of, or amount of a claim that was disputed 
as to validity or amount, or to impeach through a prior inconsistent statement or contra-
diction: (1) furnishing or offering or promising to furnish—or accepting or offering or 
promising to accept—a valuable consideration in compromising or attempting to com-
promise the claim; and (2) conduct or statements made in compromise negotiations re-
garding the claim, except when offered in a criminal case and the negotiations related to a 
claim by a public office or agency in the exercise of regulatory, investigative, or en-
forcement authority.  (b) Permitted uses. This rule does not require exclusion if the evi-
dence is offered for purposes not prohibited by subdivision (a).  Examples of permissible 
purposes include proving a witness’s bias or prejudice; negating a contention of undue 
delay; and proving an effort to obstruct a criminal investigation or prosecution. 
Id. 
 99. FED. R. EVID. 408 advisory committee’s note (citing Kenneth S. Broun, McCormick on 
Evidence §§ 76, 251, at 138–40, 431–44 (6th ed. 2006)); S. REP. NO. 93-1277 (1974) (“The purpose 
of this rule is to encourage settlements which would be discouraged if such evidence were admissi-
ble.”). 
 100. Rule 408 classifies evidence as inadmissible when used “to prove liability for, invalidity 
of, or amount of a claim.”  FED. R. EVID. 408(a).  Evidence may be offered for another purpose, such 
as “proving a witness’s bias or prejudice.”  Id.  Yet, courts have interpreted this language in a way to 
allow such evidence as admissible when used to impeach a witness.  See Cohen, supra note 24, at 
1013 (describing the impeachability inference as a loophole within Rule 408 that “may de facto 
swallow the rule”).  The practical implication of this interpretation is that if an offender apologizes 
during settlement negotiations and denies doing so at trial, the apology may be deemed admissible.  
Id. at 1035.  Consequently, if the reasoning behind Rule 408 is to provide parties with enough cer-
tainty so as to encourage them to speak freely without fear that their statements will be ruled admiss-
ible at trial, Rule 408 is unavailing. 
 101. See Bolstad, supra note 93, at 572–73 (arguing that Rule 408 offers “scant protection for 
apologies made during the course of mediation”).  Bolstad contends that the revelation of an apology 
to third parties may result in the apologizer being forced to defend numerous other suits resulting 
from such revelation.  Id. at 573. 
 102. This presents two problems: (1) It is not explicitly clear as to when a compromise negotia-
tion has begun; and (2) although a sincerely apologetic offender may want to apologize immediately 
after the harm, Rule 408 does not clearly classify such an apology as inadmissible.  FED. R. EVID. 
408; H.R. REP. NO. 93-650, at 7081 (1974) (enacting a change to Rule 408 and reversing an earlier 
judicial practice that deemed statements offered in compromise negotiations admissible in subse-
quent litigation between the parties, the House Judiciary Committee notes that, “[f]or one thing, it is 
not always easy to tell when compromise negotiations begin, and informal dealings end”).  Both of 
these problems effectually undermine the creation of the protected space between parties that Rule 
408 considers essential to making private settlements more likely.  See Cohen, supra note 24, at 
1032–35. 
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that the rule contemplates.103 Therefore, it would rarely be sound legal 
advice for a defense attorney to advise her client to deliver an apology 
that would then leave that client open to liability. 
The movement to amend the law to protect apologies as a part of 
dispute resolution is growing.104  Recognizing the value of apology, thir-
ty-five states have enacted statutes designed to encourage apologies by 
providing evidentiary protections.105 As state privileges, however, these 
statutes are not guaranteed deference in federal courts in cases involving 
federal causes of action.  A 2004 federal district court decision, Atteberry 
v. Longmont United Hospital,106 is a case in point.  Noting that a state’s 
evidentiary privilege should not be recognized or applied unless it pro-
motes sufficiently important interests to outweigh the need for probative 
evidence, the court held that such a privilege does not bar discovery re-
quests in a federal case involving pendent state jurisdiction.107  Thus, de-
fense attorneys will likely find little confidence in the reliability of state 
apology laws.  As such, some scholars advocate the amendment of the 
Federal Rules of Evidence to proscribe apologies from admissibility.108  
                                                        
 103. See Cohen, supra note 24, at 1032–35. 
 104. See generally Stephen B. Goldberg et al., DISPUTE RESOLUTION: NEGOTIATION, 
MEDIATION, AND OTHER PROCESSES 138 (5th ed. 2007); Cohen, supra note 24, at 1019; Orenstein, 
supra note 24, at 242–44; Daniel W. Shuman, The Role of Apology in Tort Law, 83 JUDICATURE 
180, 180 (2000); Levi, supra note 92, at 1166.  In addition to the strategic benefits of apologies for 
settlement, which is the focus here, a number of nonstrategic benefits of apologies in civil cases are 
also posited.  Apologies may reduce negative emotions, repair relationships, fulfill a need to make 
reparations and to restore equity, make forgiveness possible, and facilitate psychological growth.  
Goldberg et al., supra, at 138; see also Cohen, supra note 92; Michael E. McCullough et al., Inter-
personal Forgiving in Close Relationships, 73 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 321, 324 (1997); 
Elaine Walster et al., New Directions in Equity Research, 25 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 151, 
163 (1973); Gerald R. Williams, Negotiation as a Healing Process, 1996 J. DISP. RESOL. 1, 52–53 
(2006); Charlotte vanOyen Witvliet et al., Please Forgive Me: Transgressors’ Emotions and Physi-
ology During Imagery of Seeking Forgiveness and Victim Responses, 21 J. PSYCHOL. & 
CHRISTIANITY 219, 228 (2002); see, e.g., Wagatsuma & Rosett, supra note 15, at 488 (considering 
the effects of amending Rule 408 to exclude apologies, they argue that “society at large might be 
better off and better able to advance social peace if the law, instead of discouraging apologies . . . by 
treating them as admissions of liability, encouraged people to apologize to those they have wronged 
and to compensate them for their losses”).  See generally Runnels, supra note 92; see also FED. R. 
EVID. 408 advisory committee’s note (discussing part of the rationale of excluding evidence of of-
fers to compromise, the committee explains that “[t]he evidence is irrelevant, since the offer may be 
motivated by a desire for peace rather than from any concession of weakness of position”). 
 105. See States with Apology Laws, SORRY WORKS!, http://www.sorryworks.net/default/resour
ce-center/states-with-apology-laws (last visited Oct. 26, 2010). 
 106. Atteberry v. Longmont United Hosp., 221 F.R.D. 644, 646 (D. Colo. 2004). 
 107. Id. at 646–47. 
 108. See, e.g., Orenstein, supra note 24, at 247–48; Runnels, supra note 92, at 148.  Arguing 
that Rule 408 should be amended to bring it in line with its underlying policy priority of encouraging 
parties to reach private settlement, Runnels details four specific ways in which the rule could be 
amended: 
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In response to Epstein’s skepticism of the law’s ability to incentivize 
good corporate ethics, not only are the aforementioned amendments ca-
pable of bringing Rule 408 more in line with its goal of promoting the 
“public policy favoring the compromise and settlement of disputes,”109 
but empirical evidence also suggests that apologies offered within these 
proposed evidentiary constraints can increase the likelihood that the 
apology will be accepted.110 
C.  Vigilant and Responsible Media and Apology 
In an open and democratic society, Epstein considers the vigilant 
and responsible media mode of social control critical in ferreting out un-
ethical—and illegal—corporate behavior.111  Though discussed little in 
corporate law literature,112 by shedding light on corporate malfeasance, 
                                                                                                                            
(1) defining compromise negotiations as attaching immediately after an injury; 
(2) rendering an apology offered during compromise negotiations undiscoverable; 
(3) proscribing the admissibility of such apology to impeach a witness; and 
(4) proscribing the revelation of such apology to third parties.  Incorporating the afore-
mentioned definition of compromise negotiations, [the] proposed Rule 408 would read: 
(a) Prohibited uses.  Evidence of the following is not admissible on behalf of 
any party, when offered to prove liability for, invalidity of, or amount of a 
claim that was disputed as to validity or amount, or to impeach through a prior 
inconsistent statement or contradiction: (1) furnishing or offering or promising 
to furnish—or accepting or offering or promising to accept—a valuable con-
sideration in compromising or attempting to compromise the claim; and (2) 
any and all statements, affirmations, gestures, or conduct expressing apology, 
fault, sympathy, commiseration, condolence, compassion, or a general sense 
of benevolence made to any party, including any third party, in compromise 
negotiations regarding the claim, except when offered in a criminal case and 
the negotiations related to a claim by a public office or agency in the exercise 
of regulatory, investigative, or enforcement authority. (b) Permitted use.  This 
rule does not require exclusion if the evidence is offered for purposes of prov-
ing an effort to obstruct a criminal investigation or prosecution. 
Id.; see also supra note 105 and accompanying text. 
 109. See supra note 100 and accompanying text. 
 110. See Robbennolt, Apologies and Legal Settlement, supra note 92, at 490–91.  When no 
apology was offered, 52% of participants indicated that they would definitely or probably accept the 
settlement offer, while 43% would reject it, leaving 5% uncertain.  Id.  When a partial apology (a 
“partial apology” is defined as an expression of remorse or regret without any admission of fault) 
was offered, 35% of participants were inclined to accept the offer, 25% were inclined to reject it, and 
40% were uncertain.  Id.  When a full apology (a “full apology” is defined as an expression of regret 
that acknowledges fault and is coupled with compensation for the harmed party—a construction 
consisting with the definition of apology in this Article) was offered, 73% of participants were in-
clined to accept the settlement offer, with only 13–14% each rejecting the offer and remaining uncer-
tain.  Id. at 485–86. 
 111. See Epstein, supra note 28, at 212. 
 112. Despite pervasive references to media reports throughout corporate law scholarship, few 
scholars have written thorough accounts of the role of the media in corporate law.  Scholars have, 
however, highlighted the role of the media in other areas of law.  See generally Melissa B. Jacoby, 
Negotiating Bankruptcy Legislation Through the News Media, 41 HOUS. L. REV. 1091 (2004) (dis-
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the media often initiates various corrective responses, whether judicial, 
legislative, administrative, or market imposed.113  Given the law’s limited 
ability to affect good corporate governance, the media is well situated to 
incentivize ethical corporate behavior114 within a New Governance 
framework.115  Though media coverage in and of itself is unlikely to 
compel corporate apologies, there would not be certain corporate apolo-
gies but for the vigilance of a responsible media. 
In the age of the twenty-four-hour news cycle, expanding airtime 
and the accompanying expanding pot of advertising dollars have created 
                                                                                                                            
cussing the media’s role in the legislative process that ultimately led to the passage of the Bankrupt-
cy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005); M. ETHAN KATSH, LAW IN A DIGITAL 
WORLD 9 (1995).  Arguing that books about communication and society rarely focus on law, while 
books about law focus on speech regulation and free expression, but little else, Katsh notes that  
“[s]cholars seem to view the powerful realms of law and media as distinct and independent, each 
having an impact on behavior and attitudes, but having little influence on each other.”  Id.  See gen-
erally Michael J. Borden, The Role of Financial Journalists in Corporate Governance, 12 FORDHAM 
J. CORP. & FIN. L. 311 (2007) (providing a series of case studies that examine the role of the media 
in uncovering corporate wrongdoing). 
 113. See Epstein, supra note 28, at 212 (arguing that negative publicity can lead to the damage 
of company reputations, “governmental interventions, and legal liability and may result in loss of 
business”). 
 114. See, e.g., Fleishman-Hillard Research & Nat’l Consumers League, Rethinking Corporate 
Social Responsibility: Executive Summary, May 2007, 
http://www.efbayarea.org/documents/resources/general-resources/CSR-Executive-Summary-07.pdf.  
This study was conducted as a follow-up study that was originally conducted in 2005 to measure 
consumer attitudes and behaviors regarding corporate social responsibility.  Id. at 1.  Furthermore, 
the organization tracked the role that the media and technology plays in educating consumers about 
corporate behavior. Id.  After collecting and analyzing their specific data, the report revealed four 
themes: (1) “Americans expect corporations to be engaged in their communities in ways that go 
beyond just making financial contributions”; (2) “corporate America receives low marks for its CSR 
performance”; (3) “Americans believe that government should play a role in ensuring the social 
responsibility of corporations—in some industries more than others”; and (4) “[o]nline forms of 
communication continue to change the landscape in which consumers gather and communicate 
information about how well companies are being socially responsible.”  Id. 
 115. Michael Klausner, The Limits of Corporate Law in Promoting Good Corporate Gover-
nance, in RESTORING TRUST IN AMERICAN BUSINESS 91, 97–98 (Jay W. Lorsch, Leslie Berlowitz & 
Andy Zelleke eds., 2005).  Klausner explains the shortcomings of corporate law and advocates an 
emphasis on extra-legal influences on governance, which is consistent with New Governance scho-
larship.  Id.  Klausner notes that professional norms are “fostered by the financial press every time 
they write a story that exposes bad board behavior . . . .”  Id. at 98; see also Borden, supra note 112, 
at 325–26.  Borden, discussing the extra-legal role of the media in compelling corporate wrongdoers 
to act within ethical and legal norms, notes that 
one of the functions of the press in enforcement is its role as an alternative or supplement 
to legal enforcement.  To a degree, journalistic revelation of corporate malfeasance will 
in itself reduce the incidence of wrongdoing.  This is accomplished in two ways.  First, 
press coverage that brings to light a given instance of wrongdoing may actually put a stop 
to it.  Second, in an environment of heightened and effective press coverage of fraud, 
would-be fraudsters will be deterred by a heightened likelihood of discovery of their ac-
tual or potential wrongdoing. 
Id. 
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greater financial incentives for those reporters who cover important cor-
porate topics.  For example, Bethany McLean, a reporter with Fortune 
Magazine,116 spent two years researching the Enron Corporation story 
and ultimately signed a book-publishing deal with her co-author117 worth 
$1.4 million.118  McLean is now a frequent television commentator on 
several news programs.119  Although McLean’s reports did not lead to an 
apology from any of the convicted former Enron executives, such an en-
lightened self-interest can lead reporters to do well by doing good.  In the 
current socioeconomic climate, however, the CEOs who are credited by 
the media with the financial collapse of 2008 are now finally offering 
apologies that many consider too little, too late.120  Indeed, as this Article 
                                                        
 116. See, e.g., Rebecca Smith & John R. Emshwiller, Enron Prepares to Become Easier to 
Read, WALL ST. J., Aug. 28, 2001, at C1; Rebecca Smith & John R. Emshwiller, Enron Jolt: Invest-
ments, Assets Generate Big Loss—Part of Charges Tied to 2 Partnerships Interests Wall Street, 
WALL ST. J., Oct. 17, 2001, at C1; Rebecca Smith & John R. Emshwiller, Partnership Spurs Enron 
Equity Cut—Vehicle is Connected to Financial Officer, WALL ST. J., Oct. 18, 2001, at C1; Rebecca 
Smith & John R. Emshwiller, Enron CFO’s Partnership Had Millions in Profit, WALL ST. J., Oct. 
19, 2001, at C1; John R. Emshwiller, Enron Transaction Raises New Questions—A Company Execu-
tive Ran Entity that Received $35 Million in March, WALL ST. J., Nov. 5, 2001, at A3; Rebecca 
Smith & John R. Emshwiller, Trading Places: Fancy Finances Were Key to Enron’s Success, and 
Now to Its Distress—Impenetrable Deals Have Put Firm in Position Where it May Lose Indepen-
dence—Talks with Rival Dynegy, WALL ST. J., Nov. 8, 2001, at A1; Rebecca Smith & John R. 
Emshwiller, Running on Empty—Enron Faces Collapse As Credit, Stock Dive, and Dynegy Bolt—
Energy-Trading Giant’s Fate Could Reshape Industry, Bring Tighter Regulation—Price Quotes 
Suddenly Gone, WALL ST. J., Nov. 29, 2001, at A1. 
 117. BETHANY MCLEAN & PETER ELKIND, THE SMARTEST GUYS IN THE ROOM (2005). 
 118. Eric Celeste, The Claim Game, DALLAS OBSERVER, Apr. 4, 2002, 
http://www.dallasobserver.com/2002-04-04/news/the-claim-game. 
 119. McLean has appeared on numerous occasions on THE NEWS HOUR WITH JIM LEHRER, 
ENRON CEO ON THE STAND, April 17, 2006, and elsewhere. 
 120. Howard Kurtz, Media Notes: Tiger Woods, Akio Toyoda and the imperfect art of the 
apology, WASH. POST. Mar. 1, 2010, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2010/02/28/AR2010022803715.html.  Describing what he considers the defi-
ciency of the apology offered by Toyota CEO, Akio Toyoda, in front of a congressional panel, Kurtz 
sets the stage: 
Toyoda initially [declined] the congressional invitation even though he had repeatedly 
apologized for the defective cars his company has pumped out.  He was likely to get 
pounded in the coverage after being grilled by outraged lawmakers.  Once Toyoda bowed 
to the pressure, his PR folks shrewdly leaked his testimony a day in advance . . . .  They 
also placed a piece [in] the Wall Street Journal . . . in which Toyoda vowed to build “the 
safest vehicles in the world.”  He did not deliver a boffo performance on the Hill; Toyoda 
kept consulting his staff and reading from notes as he offered mostly boilerplate answers, 
or pleaded ignorance, through an interpreter. 
Id.; see also Editorial, Who’s Not Sorry Now?, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 10, 2010, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/11/opinion/11sun1.html.  Arguing that the apologies offered for 
the financial collapse of 2008 by former Citigroup executives, Charles O. Prince III and Robert E. 
Rubin, did not admit any responsibility, the Editors wrote that 
Mr. Prince says he “could not” foresee the impending collapse, when he could have and 
should have seen it coming.  Certainly, others did.  Mr. Rubin has said that under his em-
ployment agreement, he was not responsible for the bank’s operations.  But he was a to-
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suggests, any apology that is not accompanied by steps ensuring that the 
harmful act will not occur again, and is not coupled with compensation 
for the harmed parties, is quite likely ineffective.121 
D.  Self-Regulation and Apology 
Epstein defines the self-regulation mode of social control as the vo-
luntary adherence to standards set by NGOs concerned with specific is-
sues.122  These standards often establish baselines that allow corporations 
to act in the public interest without experiencing competitive disadvan-
tage.123  In the area of dispute resolution between corporations and indi-
viduals, the Sorry Works! Coalition124 is the nation’s foremost advocacy 
organization for the corporate apology.125  The Coalition discredits the 
“deny and defend” ethos promulgated by defense attorneys126 and advo-
cates a use of apology consistent with the one advocated in this Ar-
ticle.127  Accordant with Epstein’s characterization of the self-regulation 
mode of social control,128 the Coalition’s approach to the role of apology 
is now gaining adherents who are realizing the economic benefits of 
apology.  For example, in 2002, the University of Michigan Health Sys-
tem adopted the Coalition’s approach, sharing the findings with patients 
and families, apologizing, and when appropriate, offering compensation.  
The system reports that it has cut litigation costs in half and seen the fil-
ing of new claims fall by more than 40%.129  Although anecdotal, the 
                                                                                                                            
wering figure at Citi, a source of its credibility and prestige.  That implies responsibility, 
no matter what his contract said.  Add all that to the “I wasn’t the only one” context of 
both men’s comments, and their regret translates as, “We feel bad about an accident we 
were powerless to prevent.” 
Id. 
 121. See supra note 120 and accompanying text. 
 122. See Epstein, supra note 28, at 211. 
 123. See Epstein, supra note 28, at 211. 
 124. See supra note 16 and accompanying text. 
 125. See supra note 16 and accompanying text. 
 126. See supra note 18 and accompanying text. 
 127. Id. at 345 (suggesting that the elements of full disclosure are apologizing to the patient, 
admitting fault, providing an explanation of what happened, providing an explanation of how the 
hospital will prevent reoccurrence, and offering up-front compensation); DOUG WOJCIESZAK, JAMES 
W. SAXTON & MAGGIE M. FINKELSTEIN, supra note 17, at 26–65 (discussing steps to managing an 
adverse event, implementing an institutional disclosure policy, and apologizing). 
 128. See supra Part I. 
 129. Richard C. Boothman et al., A Better Approach to Medical Malpractice Claims? The 
University of Michigan Experience, 2 J. HEALTH & LIFE SCI. L. 125, 137–47 (2009) (detailing em-
pirical data that shows when doctors admit to medical error and compensate their patients quickly 
and fairly when such an error causes injury, the number of new medical malpractice claims decrease 
dramatically, resulting in significant monetary savings); see also Peter Geier, Emerging Med-Mal 
Strategy: “I’m Sorry,” NAT’L L.J., July 14, 2006, 
http://www.law.com/jsp/nlj/PubArticleNLJ.jsp?id=900005458743&slreturn=1&hbxlogin=1 (noting 
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Coalition’s work serves as an effective “proof of concept” that may help 
to inform and inspire similar efforts to encourage the corporate apology. 
III.  REVISITING EPSTEIN’S NEW GOVERNANCE FRAMEWORK 
Epstein rightly characterizes the modern CSR movement as simply 
unequipped to incentivize good corporate ethics.130  Indeed, part of this 
deficiency is rooted in the conventional debate between those arguing 
that corporations ought to do good for goodness sake and those viewing 
such do-gooding as inherently lost in translation if not tied to the corpo-
rate bottom line.131  Irrespective of these normative debates, many critics 
now view the modern CSR movement as effectively co-opted by corpo-
rate marketing strategies.132  Epstein envisions an ethical corporation not 
as an organization responsive to a nebulous CSR movement but as an 
organization subject to certain modes of social control.133 
Although Epstein effectively describes the modes that function as 
catalysts for good corporate ethics, his contention that each mode must 
be used individually to incentivize good corporate ethics134 robs the 
framework of the flexibility it needs to scrutinize a narrower set of goals.  
For instance, in the area of dispute resolution between corporations and 
individuals, an affinity group for corporations dealing solely with dispute 
resolution does not exist.  Indeed, given the confounding variables that 
typify the controversies faced by different corporate industries, the like-
lihood of a corporate affinity group crafting norms of dispute resolution 
that apply to each industry is unlikely.  Similarly, the engaged civil so-
ciety mode of social control plays a more efficient role by informing a 
vigilant and responsible media135 and, through the political process, 
electing individuals who will consider those laws that can incentivize 
corporate apologies.136 Certainly, Epstein’s prescribed order of impor-
tance for his modes of social control is similarly unequipped to incentiv-
ize corporate apologies.137 
A New Governance approach would emphasize function over form 
and link the appropriate mode(s) of social control with the specific chal-
                                                                                                                            
a drop in claims against the University of Michigan despite an increase in hospital activity every 
year after implementing the Sorry Works! Program). 
 130. See Epstein, supra note 28, at 212–13 (contextualizing the modern CSR movement as 
inherently insufficient in its goal of encouraging good corporate ethics). 
 131. See supra note 8 and accompanying text. 
 132. See supra note 12 and accompanying text. 
 133. See generally Epstein, supra note 28. 
 134. See Epstein, supra note 28, at 211–12. 
 135. By way of example, an engaged citizen may be a whistleblower who exposes corporate 
malfeasance. 
 136. See supra Part II. B. 
 137. See supra Part II. 
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lenge facing corporations.138  Such an approach provides a more nuanced 
framework with which to approach disputes as they arise and play out 
“on the ground.”  Indeed, a context-specific adaptation of Epstein’s mod-
es of social control creates a New Governance framework that provides a 
rational, systemic alternative to the “deny and defend” ethos advanced by 
defense attorneys—an ethos that all too often leads to avoidable law-
suits.139 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
In the current socioeconomic climate, the public increasingly ex-
pects to see corporations take responsibility for their actions.  Reading 
the dispute resolution and New Governance literatures together suggests 
alternative perspectives from which to consider the corporate apology.  
In the context of dispute resolution, Epstein’s modes of social control, 
working in tandem with his vision of the socially responsible corpora-
tion, provide a catalyst for discussions that seek to promote ethical cor-
porate behavior. 
By applying Epstein’s vision of how corporations function within 
certain modes of social control to the area of dispute resolution between 
corporations and individuals, this Article demonstrates that his pre-
scribed use of the framework inhibits the function the framework is in-
tended to serve.  Adapting Epstein’s framework in a manner consistent 
with a New Governance approach allows the flexibility needed to ad-
dress the utility of the corporate apology.  This Article provides this flex-
ibility and, by considering ways to incentivize the corporate apology, 
posits that good ethics can be good business. 
                                                        
 138. See supra note 26 and accompanying text; see also IAN AYRES & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, 
RESPONSIVE REGULATION: TRANSCENDING THE DEREGULATION DEBATE 38–39 (1992) (arguing 
that the adoption of a strategy that allows the changing of regulatory instruments in light of circums-
tances may be the most effective approach at influencing corporate behavior). 
 139. See, e.g., ROSENBAUM, supra note 77, at 193. Characterizing the reflex of defense attor-
neys for “warfare,” Rosenbaum argues that 
[l]awyers reflexively resort to warfare, yet the best victory could avoid fighting altogether 
and has a chance of repairing relationships and preventing people from walking away as 
ticking bombs . . . .  A sincere, artful apology defuses anger . . . .  An apology makes it 
possible to remove the hurt and indignity that underlies the insult of almost every lawsuit. 
Id. at 191.  Discussing how the role of apology is viewed by attorneys as anathema to their modus 
operandi, Rosenbaum quotes a longtime plaintiff’s lawyer who claims to never seek apologies on 
behalf of his clients: “We’re in the business of redress, the business of seeking justice under the 
justice system.  The role of the tort system is compensation, not apology.”  Id.; see also supra notes 
18–20 and accompanying text. 
